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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
KENNETH FRIEDMAN and VIRGINIA E. FRIEDMAN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.

8236

and
C. LESLIE WHEELER, JOHN H.
TEMPEST and JOHN H. TEMPEST,
JR., d.b.a. WHEELER & TEMPEST,
et al.,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Complaint

The material allegations of plaintiffs' complaint are as
follows:
On or about November 19, 1951, there occurred an
explosion in plaintiffs' residence located at 3100 South
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1640 East Street, Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 1, 2). The
explosion produced extensive damage to said residence (R.
2) . As a direct and proximate result of the explosion occurring, the plaintiff, Virginia E. Friedman, suffered fright
and marked shock to her nervous system, which caused
her continuing severe emotional and nervous upset in that
she does not sleep well and is easily disturbed and upset
(R. 4).
The complaint alleges further that plaintiffs' residence
was built in the year 1948; that the defendant, Wheeler
& Tempest, under a Salt Lake County permit, issued May
19, 1948, excavated near said residence for and on behalf
of the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and
assisted the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
in the installation of the necessary pipes and mains to
supply gas to plaintiffs' residence; that the defendant,
Byron W. Lundberg, or the defendant, Barney A. Todd,
or both of them, excavated and installed a water line in
plaintiffs' residence under a Salt Lake County permit dated
June 21, 1948, and that said excavation and waterline installation were made adjacent and against the gas line
installed by the defendants, Mountain Fuel Supply Company and Wheeler & Tempest (R. 2). The complaint charges
that the defendants are liable to plaintiffs for the damages
resulting from the explosion on the grounds that the defendants and each of them performed the work of installing
said gas and waterlines in a negligent manner so that
natural gas was permitted to escape into plaintiffs' residence other than in the mains and lines intended for that
purpose, and that said explosion was the result of gas hav-
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ing seeped into the basement of said residence and being
ignited by the flame of the pilot light of either the gas water
heater or furnace (R. 2, 3). Plaintiffs also claim that
Mountain Fuel Supply Company failed and neglected to
maintain said gas line and main in a proper and safe condition so that gas could not escape therefrom and enter
into the residence of plaintiffs other than in pipes installed
and intended for that purpose (R. 3).

Facts Established by the Evidence
The material facts established by the evidence in this
case are without substantial controversy. They are as follows:
On November 19, 1951, at a few minutes past 10:00
o'clock a. m. an explosion occurred in the basement of the
house owned by plaintiffs, located at 3100 South 1640 East
in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 143, 144, 222). The explosion caused substantial damage to the house (R. 152).
However, the explosion did not disturb the plaintiff, Mrs.
Friedman, from the position in which she was sitting in the
living room at the time of the explosion (R. 145). In support of Mrs. Friedman's claim for personal injuries, she
testified to only nervousness, loss of appetite, inability to
sleep well and putting on weight at the rate of about two
pounds a day. She was able, however, to take care of her
normal household duties and her children (R. 147, 148,
149).
An investigation to determine the cause of the explosion was made by employees of the defendant, Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, who arrived at the Friedman resi-
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dence within less than an hour after the explosion; and by
W. L. Butler, mechanical engineer for Salt Lake City Corporation, who arrived there shortly following the arrival
of the gas company employees (R. 222, 440).
When the employees of the gas company arrived at
the scene of the explosion, bubbles were coming up through
a puddle of water at the side of the blacktop in the street
in front of the Friedman residence (R. 222). Also, a strong
odor of gas coming through the water meter box was noticeable (R. 223).
An excavation was made to uncover a portion of the
gas main running north and south in the street in front
and to the east of the Friedman residence (R. 224), which
disclosed the following : The gas main had a kink in it;
"It had been pulled to the east and upward-to the east
about six inches-and upward about three or four inches
out of the straight line" (R. 224). The gas main was located a foot above and about the same distance west of a
parallel water main (R. 235-236). The gas main was
cracked where it had been kinked and the kink was located
just above where the water service line to the Friedman
residence was connected to the water main in the street
(R. 244, plaintiffs' Exhibit 33, which is a section of the
gas main in question showing the kink and crack). At the
point of the kink there were gouges which were made by
the impact of a great force (R. 246-247 and plaintiffs'
Exhibit 33) .
The testimony as to the immediate cause of the explosion and the investigation made to determine the same was
given by Mervin A. Cook, Professor of Metallurgy at the
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University of Utah, D. J. Robison, Assistant Superintendent of Distribution for Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
and W. L. Butler, Mechanical Engineer for Salt Lake City
Corporation. Mervin A. Cook testified that, in the afternoon of the day following the explosion, he made a thorough
investigation of the conditions that existed in the basement
and around the house, and so forth, to determine what
was the cause of the explosion (R. 174).
The investigation made by said witnesses disclosed that
gas had escaped from a break in the gas main in the street
in front of plaintiffs' residence and from there had migrated to and through the walls of plaintiffs' house into
the basement thereof (R. 190-191, 249, 254, 444-446, 449,
450, 463, 464). The investigation made by said witnesses
covered among other things, the gas furnace, gas water
heater, gas service line, gas meter and gas regulator, none
of which showed any damage or leakage (R. 199, 206, 208,
209, 240, 244, 254, 279-280, 417, 420, 422, 423, 435, 438,
451, 453, 455). The only conflict in the evidence, which
conflict is immaterial, is whether the gas escaping from
the break in the gas main entered the basement at the
north end of the east basement wall as testified to by Butler
and Robison, or entered at the south end of said wall
through a crack in the cement near the gas service line as
testified to by Cook (R. 175-176, 178, 188, 206-208, 223,
224, 237-238, 239, 240, 249, 450, 463).
The section of the gas main in which the break occurred (plaintiffs' Exhibit 33) was installed by the defendant, Wheeler & Tempest, during the month of February,
1948 (R. 140, 141, 287). It was a two-inch, new, wrapped,
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steel pipe with an estimated life expectancy in service of
about one hundred years and capable of holding a pressure
of 600 to 800 pounds per square inch, but to be used to
carry gas having a pressure of only 25 to 35 pounds per
square inch. It was installed with the highest degree of
care, in excellent condition and carefully tested for leakage
before being covered (R. 366-370, 382-388, 399-403). The
uncontradicted evidence shows that the gas main when installed by Wheeler & Tempest was "perfectly straight",
"was laid in perfect condition", and was not kinked as
shown by respondents' Exhibit 33 (R. 368, 370, 37 4, 379,
388, 402, 403). In view of the verdict in favor of the defendant, Wheeler & Tempest, it is conclusively established
that the gas main was properly installed, and that the kink
therein from which the break resulted cannot be attributed
to any negligence on the part of either Wheeler & Tempest
or l\1ountain Fuel Supply Company (R. 45, 101, 104, 105,
107, 108).
Under the evidence, it is indisputable that the break in
the gas main resulted from a kink therein produced by a
heavy blow which weakened the pipe and caused it to break
open suddenly within a matter of hours prior to the
explosion (R. 246, 247, 273, 274, 282, 304, 306, 308, 310311, 313, 315, 446-447, 460, 467, 468, 469).
Since the installation of the gas main was completed
and until the investigation following the explosion, Mountain Fuel Supply Company had had no occasion to excavate
said gas main (R. 248) and it is established by stipulation
that since the installation of the gas line until the time of
the explosion, the only excavation in the vicinity of said
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line was made by the defendants, Byron W. Lundberg and
Barney A. Todd in laying a water service line to plaintiffs'
house between June 21, 1940, and July 8, 1948 (R. 288,
317). All the evidence points directly to the fact that the
gas main was struck and kinked by a mechanical digger,
known as a back-hoe, while digging the trench for said
water service line (R. 246-248, 294, 297, 298, 311, 313, 325,
333, 490, 494). The defendants, Lundberg and Todd and
the witnesses produced by them were evasive and never
directly denied that such was the fact (R. 294, 319, 320,
322, 327, 504-506, 511, 512, 517).
The evidence is conclusive that Mountain Fuel Supply
Company had no notice of any leak in its line nor any opportunity to have learned of the same prior to the explosion (R. 176, 192, 199, 270, 282, 283, 308, 310, 460, 467,
468). ~/Irs. Friedman testified that she had never detected
the odor of gas prior to the explosion (R. 149). All the
witnesses, including those sponsored by plaintiffs, testified that the break in the line occurred suddenly and within
a matter of hours prior to the explosion (R. 270, 282, 283,
460, 467, 468). It is apparent from plaintiffs' Exhibit 33
that a large quantity of gas was escaping from the broken
main. Professor Cook, plaintiffs' witness, testified that
the gas accumulated in the basement of said house rapidly
-within less than a half hour-before the occurrence of
the explosion (R. 176, 192, 199).

Proceedings Following Close of Evidence
At the close of all of the evidence, the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, moved for a directed verdict
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(R. 519). The case was submitted to the jury which returned a verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company
for general and special damages and for damages to Mrs.
Friedman. The jury returned separate verdicts in favor
of the other defendants (R. 43-50). Following the reception of the verdict, the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, pursuant to Rule 50 (b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, moved to have the verdict against it and
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment
entered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 120-121).
The trial court denied each of said motions (R. 128). Thereafter, the appellant duly perfected an appeal from the
judgment entered in this case (R. 130-136).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The verdict of the jury and the judgment entered
thereon against appellant is not supported by the record
in this case or anY substantial evidence therein, and the
trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendant,
l\iountain Fuel Supply Company, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
1.

2. The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion
for a new trial.
{a) The trial court erred in instructing the jury to
the prejudice of the appellant.
(b) The trial court erred in precluding appellant
from proving its second defense to respondents' complaint.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE
JUDGMENT ENTERED THEREON AGAINST
APPELLANT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE OR ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THEREIN AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE DEFENDANT, MOUNTAIN FUEL
SUPPLY COMPANY, FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING TI-IE VERDICT.
The controlling principles of law in ruling on a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict have been stated
in the following cases recently decided by this court:
In Jackson v. Colston et al., 116 Utah 288, 209 P. 2d
566, the court states the law as follows:
"The only question here to be decided is whether
the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants. It is fundamental that the burden rests upon
the plaintiff to establish the causal connection between the injury and the alleged negligence of the
defendant: Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51
Utah 189, 170 P. 80; that the court may not permit
the jury to speculate concerning defendants' liability; Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 94
Utah 76, 75 P. 2d 660; and that the court is required to direct a verdict unless there is evidence
from which the jury could reasonably find in favor
of the plaintiff."
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In Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 239 P. 2d
17 4, the court held :
"We have no disagreement with the time-honored rule that if there is substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the trier of the fact it will
not be disturbed on review. But that means more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. See 9 Wigmore,
3d Ed., Sec. 2494, for a discussion of the test to be
applied to the quantum of evidence necessary to
support a finding by the trier of facts. In that section, at page 296, he says, 'There was an old phrase
that a mere scintilla of evidence was sufficient; but
this has been abandoned by most courts.' Citing a
plethora of cases. After referring to a variety of
methods of phrasing the rule and a great many authorities, he concludes the section with this: 'Perhaps the best statement of the test is: Are there
facts in evidence which if unanswered would justify
men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming
the question which the plaintiff is bound to maintain.' We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wigmore. If there is any substantial competent evidence
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably
could make the finding, it should stand. But if the
finding is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the
court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could
make the finding, it cannot be said to be supported
by substantial evidence. See also 20 Am. Jur. 1033."
In Boskovich v. Uta.h Const. Co., (Utah), 259 P. 2d
885, this court held :

"It is fundamental that where there is no evidence upon a material part of the plaintiff's claim,
it is the court's duty to direct a verdict."
The claims stated in the complaint upon which plaintiffs seek relief from the Mountain Fuel Supply Company
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are that the work of installing the gas line in question was
performed in a negligent manner so that natural gas was
permitted to escape into plaintiffs' residence and also that
Mountain Fuel Supply Company failed and neglected to
maintain said gas line and main in proper and safe condition so that gas could not escape therefrom and enter
into the residence of plaintiffs. In support of said claims,
plaintiffs introduced into evidence a section of the gas
main in front of plaintiffs' residence which showed a kink
and break therein as the same existed at the time of the
explosion (Exhibit 33). The gas line in question was installed for Mountain Fuel Supply Company by Wheeler &
Tempest who were independent contractors with many
years of experience in the installation of gas and other
utility lines. Although it be conceded that any negligence
of Wheeler & Tempest in making such installation would
be imputable to Ivlountain Fuel Supply Company, it is now
conclusively established in this case by the verdict in favor
of Wheeler & Tempest that the gas line was not negligently
installed. It is also established by the record in this case
that the kink and resulting crack in the main, as shown
by Exhibit 33, which permitted gas to escape and seep into
plaintiffs' basement were caused by a heavy blow inflicted
subsequent to its installation by persons other than the
defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company.
As pointed out under the statement of facts, the pipeline in question was new pipe which was installed by
Wheeler & Tempest with the highest degree of care. It is
undisputed that, but for the damage inflicted to the pipe
by a person or persons other than Mountain Fuel Supply
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Company, it would not have ruptured and permitted the
escape of gas. Professor Mervin B. Hogan, head of the
Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University
of Utah, who was sponsored by and testified in behalf of
plaintiffs, stated that in his judgment the break in the pipe
was caused by the impact of some metallic body which
made the kink in the pipe (R. 315). He testified:
"Q. Now, the situation which you describe as
to the traffic over the street, and so forth, that has
relation to the fact that this pipe has been damaged
by some blow ; is that correct?
"A. Oh, yes, sir; yes, without that damage,
there would be no stress concentration.
"Q.

"A.

Yes; and, if-you have examined the pipe?
Yes, sir.

"Q. And, if the ·pipe hadn't been damaged, you
wouldn't expect that to have happened?
"A. I am sure it wouldn't" (R. 310-311).

The record, without conflict, shows that Mountain Fuel
Supply Company had no notice of the leak in or of the damaged condition of the gas main until its investigation following the explosion. Mrs. Friedman testified that she had
not at any time prior to this explosion detected the odor of
gas (R. 149). Both plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses
testified, without conflict, that the rupture in the gas main
which permitted gas to escape occurred suddenly and within
a few hours prior to the time of the explosion; thus, no
opportunity was afforded the gas company to have discovered and repaired the damage to the ruptured pipe.
According to Professor Hogan, the blow and resulting kink
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in the pipe resulted in an area of stress which eventually
caused it to suddenly rupture or "flip open" (R. 308-310).
Mr. Robison and Mr. Butler, who testified on the subject,
stated that the break in the pipe would have occurred within
a matter of hours prior to the explosion (R. 270, 467, 468).
Howsoever the evidence may be viewed, the record in
this case is conclusive that the gas line in question was
properly installed, and that the break in the line which
permitted gas to escape into plaintiffs' residence was caused
by damage to the same inflicted subsequent to its installation by the negligent acts of a person or persons other than
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company. The evidence all
points to the fact that the kink in the line that eventually
resulted in the break was caused by the impact of a mechanical digger which, subsequent to the installation of the
gas main, was used to excavate a trench for the installation
of the water service line to plaintiffs' residence.
The record shows, therefore, that plaintiff not only
failed to produce any substantial evidence of an act or
omission on the part of Mountain Fuel Supply Company
which proximately caused the injuries complained of, but
that such injuries were proximately caused by the negligent act of some third party or parties.
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict specifically
called the trial court's attention to the proposition that the
plaintiff, Virginia E. Friedman, could not recover upon
her claim set forth in the third count of the complaint, because the evidence showed that her alleged damages were
based solely on fright and mental disturbances unaccompanied or preceded by physical injury (R. 519).
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The testimony of Mrs. Friedman with respect to her
claimed damages is as follows: That she was sitting in the
living room at the time of the explosion (R. 144-145) ; that
the explosion did not disturb her from the position in which
she was sitting (R. 145) ; that after the explosion she became extremely nervous, was not able to eat very well,
couldn't sleep, and started putting on weight at about the
rate of 2 pounds per day (R. 147). She testified ~hat this
condition continued for about three weeks (R. 148).
The applicable rule is concisely stated in 15 Am. Jur.,
Section 189, at Page 608, as follows:
"Generally, however, no recovery can be had for
fright alone caused by a negligent act which is
neither accompanied nor followed by physical injury. In other words, mere fright alone cannot be
made the basis of an action for damages, unless
caused by the willful wrong of another."
In State v. Baltimore Transit Company, 80 A. 2d 13,
28 A. L. R. 1061, the court held that damages for mental
distress in connection with an injury to property is not recoverable in an action for the property tort. Following this
case is an exhaustive annotation on the subject of "Recovery
for mental shock or distress in connection with injury to
or interference with tangible property". 28 A. L. R. 2d
1070-1104.
POINT NO.2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Our principal point is that the judgment entered on
the verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company is not
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supported by the record in this case or any substantial
evidence therein, and that the trial court erred in denying
appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, as provided by Rule 50 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant prayed that, if its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be denied,
appellant be granted a new trial. The argument which
follows is directed at the court's denial of said motion.
(a) The trial court erred in instructing the jury to
the prejudice of appellant.
The trial court gave certain instructions to the jury
under which they were required to make findings as to
facts which were not in issue, nor supported by any substantial evidence. It is well settled that to so instruct is
prejudicial error as it permits a jury to return a verdict
based on speculation. The instructions complained of are
the following:
Instructions 13, 19 and 20 present to the jury an issue
of fact as to whether Mountain Fuel Supply Company had
furnished defective pipe for installation by Wheeler &
Tempest (R. 99, 105, 106). The complaint makes no such
claim. The negligence charged under the complaint is :
"That the defendants and each of them performed the work of installing said services in a careless and negligent manner, so that natural gas was
permitted to escape into plaintiffs' residence * * *
and that the negligent and careless manner in which
defendants and all of them caused said line to be
installed was the direct and proximate cause of said
explosion and the resultant damage" (R. 2, 3).
The record contains no evidence that the pipeline, as
originally furnished to Wheeler & Tempest, was defective.
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The uncontradicted evidence is to the contrary (R. 228,
230, 244-246, 347, 348, 366-370, 382-388, 399-403). ,Moreover, it is established by plaintiffs' own witness, who had
examined the pipe in question, that the sole cause of the
break in the main was its obvious damaged condition resulting subsequent to its installation and without which it
would not have ruptured and permitted the escape of gas
(R. 310-311).
Instructions 12, 14 and 20 directed that the jury return a verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company if
said Company had failed to use ordinary care in inspecting
and maintaining its gas line prior to the explosion. This
instruction is unsupported by any evidence in the record.
The undisputed evidence is to the contrary : As hereinabove pointed out, the sole cause of the break in the pipe
was a kink made in it by the impact of a heavy force occurring subsequent to its intallation by the act of a person
or persons other than appellant, and, undoubtedly, by the
operator of a mechanical digger who was digging a trench
for the installation of water service line to plaintiffs' residence.
Respondents' witness, Professor Hogan testified:
"Q. I understood you to say, Doctor, that the
blow could cause the kink right at the place where
the break is?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And there is evidence of marks that, that
might have come from a tooth on a power shovel, is
that right?
"A. It would be my opinion, that is true, yes
sir" (R. 313).
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Respondents' complaint does not claim that appellant
had notice of said damage done to its pipe or the leak
thereafter resulting therefrom. It is uncontradicted that
appellant had no such notice. Furthermore, under the evidence it is clear that no reasonable care on appellant's part
could have prevented the escape of gas from its main and
the resulting explosion because, as testified to by both respondents' and appellant's witnesses, the rupture in the
pipe occurred suddenly and within a very short time prior
to the explosion.
Mr. W. L. Butler, an independent witness, who for
many years has been the mechanical engineer for Salt Lake
City Corporation, testified concerning this subject as follows:
."Q. For the Gas Company. You have an opinion as to how soon before the explosion this break
occurred?
"A. Yes, I have an opinion. I couldn't-! don't
think anyone could be definite on their opinion.
"Q. I understand, of course, we are· surmising
in all things, that is; how soon before the explosion
occurred would you estimate this break was present
-occurred?
"A. I would think within, safely, within 24
hours.
"Q.

"A.

24 hours?
Yes.

"Q. You think it would take 24 hours for gas,
under 25-pound pressure, to force its way up through
three feet of concrete sufficient to create a bubbling
and a pool of water?
"A. It wasn't concrete.
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"Q. Through ground, I am sorry. No evidence
of concrete, of course.
"A. No, it wouldn't take that long to force it
up there. It probably would be apparent there, depending on the soil, the condition of the soil, maybe
. in an hour or less.

You think it would take an hour?
"A. But that wasn't my opinion. My opinion
was, how long maximum time elapsed between the
break and the explosion.
"Q.

"Q. Well, that is what I asked you; you said
24 hours, didn't you?
"A. I would say within 24 hours would be my
opinion.
"Q. Is it possible, in your opinion, that this
break, as it is now indicated and as you saw it when
it was excavated, could have been open to that degree and it would take 24 hours for that explosion
to occur"A. Yes, what"Q. (Continued) -before" A. I don't say it was 24 hours. I say within
24 hours. It could have been within an hour-the
maximum time would be.
"Q. Yes, I understand you don't think this is
a gradual process; you don't think this pipe opened
just a tiny bit, and within 24 hours, expanded to its
present position?
"A. I think the straining was a gradual process and it finally reached the maximum that that
side of the pipe could be strained and opened.
"Q.

"A.

You mean causing the ultimate break?
Yes" (R. 467-468).
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Instruction 19 is clearly erroneous because it directs
that the jury may return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
Virginia E. Friedman, for "personal injury damage * * *"
and "for such mental suffering which said plaintiff has
endured". There was no claim or evidence whatever of any
physical injury to Mrs. Friedman. She testified to only
fright and mental disturbance. As hereinabove pointed out,
this was no basis for recovery in this action.
(b) The trial court erred in precluding appellant
from proving its second defense to respondents' complaint.

Appellant's answer pleads the following defense to
respondents' complaint:

"Second Defeme
"This defendant is informed and believes, and
therefore alleges, that the Westchester Fire Insurance Company of Illinois was prior to the institution of this action and now is the owner of the claim
and cause of action sued upon herein jointly by the
plaintiffs, Kenneth Friedman and Virginia E. Friedman and that said Westchester Fire Insurance Company is the real party in interest to prosecute such
claim and action and is an indispensable party thereto" (R. 12).
Said defense is based on Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

"Even/ action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust,
a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his own name with-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
out joining with him the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the State of Utah."
Prior to the trial of this case, respondents moved to
strike said defense as follows :
"Come now the plaintiffs above named and move
the court for an order striking the Second Defense
appearing in the answer of the defendant, Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, on the ground and for the
reason that said Second Defense is immaterial and
upon the further ground that facts are not stated
therein sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiffs' action" (R. 24).
Said motion was argued before the Honorable A. H.
Ellett, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt Lake
County, who ordered that said motion to strike be denied
(R. 28). At the trial of this cause before the Honorable
Martin M. Larson, the following proceedings occurred :
"MR. HENDERSON: The defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, makes proffer of proof
of its second defense, which is based on Rule 17A
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides· that every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, and would make
such proof except as otherwise precluded by the
ruling of this court. And do I understand, your
Honor, that you would sustain objection to that?
"THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. HENDERSON: To such proof?
"THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. HANSON: \Ve object to it, of course.
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"THE COURT: The offer of proof made by
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, defendant, with
regard to its second defense, as set up in its answer,
is denied, and refused by the court, the objection
thereto sustained, the court taking the view that
the \\ estchester Fire Insurance Company of Illinois,
while it may be a proper or allowable party in the
action-that is, could have been made a party to
the action-is not a necessary or indispensible party
to the action, and the matters involved in the second
defense are not, in the court's view, a proper and
effective defense to the action, and such matters
would be irrelevant and immaterial" (R. 139).
7

In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R.
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 Pacific 653, the court pointed out that
the former code section from which Rule 17 (a) was taken
differed from the codes of several other states, and that
said provision is most sweeping in its terms. The court
held in discussing the remedies of a defendant in raising
the defense provided for under said rule that, if it does
not appear upon the face of the complaint that there is
another party interested in the subject of the action, the
objection may be taken by answer. The ruling in said case
was approved in the case of Bank of American Fork v.
Smith, 44 Utah 284, 140 P. 122.
We submit that the ruling of the trial court in precluding appellant from proving said defense in effect abrogates
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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CONCLUSION
The jury's verdict and the judgment entered thereon
are not supported by the record made in this case. If the
judgment against appellant is permitted to stand, the appellant will be required to respond in damages caused from
no fault on its part, but from the acts committed by a person or persons other than appellant.
We also have assigned as error the court's denial of
appellant's alternate motion for a new trial on the grounds
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury and in precluding appellant from proof of its
second defense to respondents' complaint.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that justice in

this case requires the judgment entered on the verdict
against appellant be set aside and judgment be entered in
favor of appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES
& HENDERSON,
1011 Walker B~nk Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
and B. Z. KASTLER,
36 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah,
Attorneys for Appellant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company.
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